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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAWYER
IN THE MODERN WORLD
The era in which Brazil and the entire world is living is characterized
by a state of apprehension which spreads over a Europe, now subjugated,
now uneasy; over an Africa torn by war, racism and violent disputes
over power; over an Asia rent by bloody dissension between peoples and
between nations; over a North America, which after losing the tranquility
of its peaceful and prosperous days now suffers the vengeful aggressiveness
of its black population and its youth; and over a Latin America violently
shaken by bellicose opposition to legitimate regimes or to military govern-
ments. The dramatic era in which we live, by throwing legality into a
state of crisis, intensifies and exalts the duty to fight for the preservation
and improvement of the juridical order. This is a tremendous task that,
going far beyond the demands of daily routine, measures its strength
through the survival of the law as a permanent value in the life of man,
along with peace, well-being and progress.
But this conflict, which spreads over all the continents even though
possessing specific national traits has Pharisaism as its common factor. As
Alceu de Amoroso Lima recently pointed out, each faction supposes itself
to be completely in the right and is devoid of sufficient serenity or humanity
to recognize any virtue in the opposing side. Each faction is master of the
truth, the whole truth, and so sure of its verities that it cannot even be
questioned, contesting any assumption of error and attempts to change.
The dissenter is an adversary to the institutions, to the country, and is
serving the foreigner. This happens in both the western and socialist camps.
In the latter, the adversaries are always said to be in the service of economic
imperialism; in the former, in the service of international communism.
This world of intolerance thus fosters the injustices which the passions of
the intolerant cause to multiply. This state of affairs enhances the signifi-
cance of the lawyer. Thus it is inherent in his profession and in his ethical
*This article, translated from the Portuguese, is an extract of the remarks made
by Dr. M. Seabra Fagundes of the Brazilian Lawyers Institute, at his inauguration
as President of that Institute.
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training to fight for everyone's rights against the rights of one or of all,
for everyone's rights against the wielders of political or economic power,
and against all forms of denial or injury. In doing so, to be sure, he is
faced with misunderstandings, not the least of which is to attribute to
him, out of either ignorance or bad faith, that he shares the oppressed
client's political ideas, or even that he has been ensnared by the State's
repressive machinery. His professional activity then becomes more than
ever one of personal dignity, of silent and anonymous bravery. In this way,
much more so than is apparent in the vicissitudes of forensic daily routine,
he contributes to the preservation of what is best in the moral context of
society, namely the nobility of justice which is, after all, the basic factor
in the formation of the normal man.
THE RESISTANCE TO LAW
When it falls to our lot to make an important contribution to our great
Fatherland in order to safeguard a patrimony which is that of the entire
civilized world, more tenacity, valor and faith is increasingly demanded.
It must not be overlooked that a mission of this nature, being characteristic
of an entity such as ours should not be permitted to reach the paroxysm of
polemic exaltation.
Will resistance through law be in vain? Will it be inconsequential?
Will it not transcend the quixotic pretension of opposing the aspiration for
justice and peace, to the predominance of material power in this juncture in
the life of nations? It may be, but only in its immediate results since
History, still and always the master in the life of people, shows us that the
eclipses of legal nature endure only so long as the forcible submission of
the people prevails.
The people may remain quiet submissively but they will not readily
or gladly accept any type of paternalism. The precarious nature of govern-
ments of force cannot be measured by the number of years they remain
in power, but rather by the apparatus of violence that guarantees their
presence, in contrast with the periodic assumption of leadership resulting
from elections in a system that requires only routine police supervision.
Against governments of force there is a sort of tacit mobilization of opinion
waiting its time to break forth. Nazism proposed to last for a thousand
years, and fascism did not estimate that it would remain in power for only
two decades. The communist dictatorships, despite their overwhelming
police apparatus prove not to be exempt from rebellions, sometimes bloody
ones.
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MORAL PROGRESS IN PEOPLES LIVES
Unfortunately, the unbridled ambition for political power, sometimes
more unbridled than the ambition for money because power also brings
wealth, does not permit History's lesson to be learned quickly. G. B. Shaw
was almost right when he said:
Experience shows that man learns nothing from experience.
Even if resistance to arbitrariness, being practically impossible to
control, were only a vain attempt, it still would be worthwhile because of
its moral content. Someone must resist in the name of basic values for
the security, tranquility, peace and decent well-being of human society.
Because, as Gladstone warned his fellow countrymen when England had
not yet matured into institutional life, "There is more in the world than
political needs; there are moral needs. Remember that the sanctity of
life in the villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows is as inviolable
in the eyes of the Almighty as in our cities."
If the history of nations is frequently woven out of violence, guile
and even shabby interest, it is nonetheless true that moral progress in
the life of peoples is due to the sacrifices, so often anonymous, of per-
sistent idealists who, reprobates today, are the artificers, or even the
heroes, identified or not, of tomorrow.
HERITAGE OF THE ARCHITECTS OF NATIONALITY
Defense of the juridical order, while a duty of honor for us lawyers,
is a welcome duty because in fulfilling it, we have a rendezvous with
the glorious constitutional and legal tradition of Brazil, stereotyped but
edifying over the course of its political life, first during the period of
the Empire and later in the Republic.
Actually, a glance at history will show us that the pioneer architects
of our nationality have bequeathed to the nation the love of constitutional
order, which is tantamount to saying: limitation on power, with the neces.
sary respect for individual rights. This concept was expressed, in impres-
sive fashion when the Empire was still immature, in Peter I's reaction to
the unusual acclaim with which the people received him in the Church
of Saint Francis de Paula: "Long live the Emperor, so long as he is
constitutional." Far from using the police to repress the daring cry, the
young monarch serenely replied: "I am, always have been and will be
constitutional." And because he was imbued with this spirit he could
proudly say to Pontois, French Charg6 d'Affaires, on the very day of the
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abdication: "I renounce the crown with the glory of ending in the same
way as I began--constitutionally."
Further, this belief of the admirable statesmen who consolidated the
Empire permitted Joaquini Nabuco, referring to Diego Feij6 who assumed
command when the country was approaching a state of anarchy and its
very territorial unity was endangered, to say that "a churchman was able
to implant order without having to appeal to foreigners, without fortresses,
without spies, without trapdoors where bodies disappear clandestinely,
and without placing the whole society incommunicado."
The Revolution of 1817, in the fleeting months of its existence, had
a constitutional act handed down by the governing council of Recife
which, although having to tackle the uncertainties of armed conflict,
limited its own powers and defined rights. The Ragamuffin Epic was
distinguished by its appreciation of legality. When the Chamber of
Jaguarao turned to Bento Gongalvez, elevating him to Chief of the Govern.
ment and Protector of the Republic and liberty of Rio Grande, it did not
fail to stipulate that they "were responsible for setting the day when
deputies must be elected to the constitutional assembly, in whose hands
is to be deposited the power now temporarily conferred on them, for
transmission to such persons as it may deem proper." A similar restriction
appears in the document that the Chamber of Piratinim subsequently
issued. Therein it is written that it is a duty: "to convoke, whenever
circumstances permit, a general and constitutional assembly of the Rio
Grande Republic in order to create a Constitution of the Republic, in
which it shall vest the powers at present delegated to him, and finally,
shall govern this State by the laws in force, insofar as this may be
compatible with our circumstances and the state of revolution in which
we now find ourselves." Furthermore, the Constitution of the Empire
was declared applicable insofar as it could be adjusted to the require-
ments of the Republic. It was this feeling of relationship between power
and the legal order that caused Peter II to state in the Regent's Councils,
referring to the criticism of his person in the press: "It is my intent that
complete freedom should be allowed in these manifestations. The attacks
on the Emperor, when they are made in a spirit of seeking to act for
the general good, are not to be considered personal but simply as a
partisan unburdening of the heart."
This spirit permitted the five years of the War of the Triple Alliance
to pass without a suspension of constitutional guarantees. Even so, Caxias,
the admirable architect of victory, already consecrated by his services to
the territorial unity of the Fatherland, was the target of an intense and
bitter political and press campaign.
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This was the spirit, also, in the dramatic days of the Floriano Govern-
ment, even under a state of siege and in the midst of so many instances of
violence, that permitted the press to be spared from censorship. Some-
thing survived even amid the storm of passions.
In the glorious days of 1932, Sao Paulo sacrificed itself in demanding
constitutional order as opposed to arbitrary power.
Our tradition of reverence for law acquired projection into the sphere
of international relations when the First Republic Constitution, ahead of
the whole civilized world by many years, stipulated that Brazil "would not
engage in any war of conquest, either direct or indirect, alone or in
alliance with another nation" (Art. 88), and when the Political Charter
of 1934, in Art. 4 added that Brazil "will declare war only if recourse
to arbitration is impossible or should prove to be fruitless."
CONTINUITY OF THE NATION
At times it has been denied that this liberal past was a valid con-
tribution in view of the actual situation in Brazil and of the realism
required to organize the Nation's constitutional life. This criticism is
based sometimes on sincere motives, at other times it originates more
from opportunism and unbridled greed for political power. However,
what actual state of affairs would this lead to? For some, that of a
present in which infiltrations from the outside, with arms of resources
lead them to believe that the national traditions are menaced by inter-
national communism; for others, that the country's independence is
threatened by economic imperialism. But the past, in a Nation's life,
also constitutes a datum of reality. And not one to be despised, either,
since the Nation is a continuum, not an episode. Today we, the Brazilian
people, are continuing it. We are the same ones who sanctified with our
blood the pre-Independence epics; the same people who, at a slow pace, as
is always the pace of political life, abandoned, in the atrocities of the
Federalist Revolution, the last traces of hatred between brothers and
attained, in less than fifty years, the ideal stage, which many might envy,
of harmonious settlement of controversies.
If this is the contribution of the past, strengthcned with the passage
of time, then it should not be ignored when it is sought to mold political
institutions consonant with the actual state of affairs in Brazil. These
institutions must be in keeping with the imperatives of our era where
the aggressiveness of ideological action is a phenomenom in all countries.
But, not to the extent that they fail to take heed of the special structures
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in accordance with inspirations originating elsewhere and of foreign
adaptations.
This truth is recorded by Jos6 Bezerra Cimara, in the Subsidios para
a Histeria do Direito Pdtrio: "A false notion of the problems relating
to the social order was the supposition that new legal conceptions preclude
the lessons furnished by the past, all the more so as historical factors are
not improvised, nor do they reside entirely in a subjective element. Even
when they are not assimilated, they do not for that reason cease to afford
indispensable suggestions and lessons."
THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PENCHANT
Fidelity to the democratic ideal of peoples is considered to be
spontaneously revealed in the length of time that the advanced countries
have existed.
The United States, although needing to control the youth revolt and
vindictive black power, as well as organized crime, does not even think
of suppressing the fundamental freedoms, whose respect honor its past,
nor does it even think of mutilating the representative system, whose
purity so exalts the fatherland of Washington, Lincoln and Kennedy.
If it had done so, the American Union would have become just another
nation, deprived of its fundamental characteristics under the outer cloak
of policies alien to its traditions. And instead of earning world admiration,
which its love of freedom of expression and thought and the democratic
interplay of the representative system inspires, it would have remained on
a plane of mediocrity unworthy of the great pioneers of Virginia and
Philadelphia. But far from that, the nation at war in exemplary fashion,
allows a faction hostile to the government's war policy to parade with its
placards of accusation and ridicule. It was out of fidelity to the democratic
sentiment peculiar to its people that Chile, not many months ago, suspended
constitutional guarantees for only three days, the time necessary to contain,
in the acute phase, a barracks movement. Out of the consideration that
man's fundamental rights were integrated into its institutions as a
national patrimony, could the French Constitution of 1958 afford not to
state them? These fundamental rights are incorporated in the people's
juridical conscience, already expressed in the preamble of the 1946
Charter, to which the former document refers. Thus, a government em-
powered to contain by excessive force the Parisian uprising of 1968
preferred to discredit it through an appeal to the enlightened vote of
the nation, which reaffirmed its democratic sentiment agains the disorder.
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The government's behaviour is an outgrowth of the country's beliefs and
constitutional tradition.
LIBERALISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE
A legal order is called liberal when it is based on a tradition of
respect for a body of individual rights. But, even if it should be called
by any other name, the fact is that it is increasingly in man's aspiration,
that a State should accomplish its mission without oppression. In this
train of thought, political liberalism can be said to be mistaken for
democracy itself, since it is manifested in the existence of a list of
basic rights for mankind, by dint of which political power is limited in
its expansion. There, it rests with the citizens to choose and to voice their
opinions concerning their rulers and the composition of their governments.
Present-day constitutional texts confirm this. There is today no constitution
that fails to list and guarantee, as rights, the free expression of thought,
freedom of the press and information, inviolability of the home, full
defense for the accused, freedom of movement, the right to vote, im-
prisonment only upon judicial verdict, etc. Over and above all, the
presence of political liberalism in the lives of peoples is documented by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, voted by all the member
states of the United Nations, which is the repository, updated and
expanded, of the precepts originally inspiring the liberal idea. If practice
disavows liberalism, it does not disavow it more than in other ages, since
it arose as the fruit of oppressed man's demands (Declaration of Rights
of 1789) or of the spontaneous wisdom of the political sense (Virginia
Bill of Rights). History reveals that force alternates with reason in
the government of peoples, and this alternation is manifested in negative
or affirmative views with respect to the idea of liberty. However, what
places liberalism in the tableau of the political life of peoples is that its
basic concepts are an abiding and sustaining aspiration for which people
will fight when they see them frustrated. That is why even in those
countries whose political police see, control and repress everything, the
infernal machine of pressure and repression is occasionally stymied. What
is needed is not to regard the suppression of public liberties by the
force of the dictatorial state as the obsolescence of political liberalism.
What is now transcended, as noted by Burdeau, is not political
liberalism. The freedom to criticize and the opportunity to influence the
composition of governmental bodies are aspirations that are increasingly
rooted in man's spirit. What has been transcended is the liberal state,
the state of "let it happen; let it go." "If the liberal state is a thing of
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the past this does not mean," he said, "that liberalism disappears with
it in the ashes of history. The liberal state was a cohesive system of
political institutions, economic concepts and social relations whose con-
text imparted an original style to both public and private collective life.
Liberalism, conversely, is a state of mind. Its vitality is not subordinated
to the existence of a single type of political regime that would enjoy
a sort of exclusivity to serve its aspirations." And he adduced that a
distinction had to be drawn "between the liberal state, a historical event,
and liberalism, a political philosophy."
PRESERVATION OF FREEDOM
State intervention in the economic order, which under the generalized
circumstances of the contemporary world (international competition, in-
fluence of technology, capitalist versus socialist imperialism) has become-
necessary, although to a variable extent from country to country, along
with state interference designed to attenuate social injustices, denatures
the power of the liberal democratic state's power, a mere spectator of
economic and labor relations. State intervention did not, however, bring
about the restriction or denial of rights outside these spheres, i.e., in-
dividual rights, the heart of political liberalism.
What is necessary is that there be no confusion between the essential
and traditional liberties, including that of free expression of political
thought through divergency and criticism, not measured and consented,
but free in incisiveness, with freedom to destroy the democratic state
itself, that is to say, the essential and traditional liberties. "True liberty,"
writes Sartori, "respects authority, in the same way as genuine authority
recognizes liberty. Liberty that does not recognize authority is arbitrary,
licentia (license) and not libertas (liberty). Conversely, authority that
does not acknowledge liberty is authoritarianism."
The juridical order is not an artful formalism contrived by idle
chatterers. It is, above all, the imperium of the Constitution in its struc-
tural whole and plenitude of its dynamism. Whoever speaks of constitu-
tion speaks of limitation of powers, since that is the paramount objective
of constitutional charters. When power is limited it is precisely to safe-
guard rights against the misuse of force; and whoever speaks of preserva-
tion of individual rights means respect for the human being, in his
aspirations, his words, his life, and his physical, intellectual and moral
integrity, since it is these elements that comprise the heart of individual
rights. The juridical order is the imperium of all laws that complete
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the basic organization of the State. It is the imperium of the law which
acts as an impersonal rule limiting the power of those who govern and
the freedom of the governed, as a disciplinary code of principles for
people living together, and as a primary instrument for peace in day-to-day
collective human relationships. It is indispensable for all those desiring
security and well-being for all in the community.
That the task of governing with the concomitant right to dissent, to
express oneself in controversies, in interpellations, and to voice criticisms
and protests is very difficult, cannot be gainsaid. Only the superiority
of spirit of the great statesmen and true patriots can bear, with democratic
resignation, the criticism and protests, the invective, often unjust, in
order to avoid the greater evil of his fellowman's submission through
violence. It is possible that someone may reply to this paraphrasing
Lord Melbourne, for whom the damned moralism of the Victorian age
would end up by ruining everything: this damned juridical order will
wind up ruining everything!
The task of governing doubtless becomes simpler when the voices of
some superior interest are stilled by force, whether overt or not. There
is found government without greatness, but with peace, the peace of
submission. But this is not peace worthy of the name since, as Pope
Paul VI has just proclaimed, there is no peace where civil liberties and
freedom of belief are not respected.
REAL, NOT FORMAL LEGALITY
But the juridical order, i.e., legality in its broad sense, is not
manifested only in a body of rules. It also has a dynamism of its own.
When a juridical order is referred to, we assume non-arbitrary
legality, one deriving from a legalistic representative system created with
the consent of those whom it is intended to govern. This is the legality
worthy of so illustrious a name because it is not a trick for whitewashing
the exercise of power, vulnerable to each nod from those who command,
as happens in the single-party states where manipulation of the written
law occurs. This results from the self-interest of the ruling class or the
group wielding power, and thus the legal rule is no defense against
arbitrariness since it always conforms to their efforts to legalize it.
Legality must be democratic in the sense that it emanates from the people
by means of the representative system and is directed toward the people
by virtue of the impersonality of its wording. It is an impersonal legality,
drafted without being aimed at individuals. For only the general regula-
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tion, abstracted from conduct, can properly be classed as a law. When
legality is shaped today in order to legalize an act that is to be executed
tomorrow, it is nothing more than a falsification of the juridical order,
with the law that is supposed to limit human behaviour actually limiting
nothing. This is the source of the theory of the separation of the powers,
in which Montesquieu discovered an instrument for assuring liberty.
This is true in spite of the willful efforts that have been made to dis-
credit it, leveling at it the distorted allegation, so dear to the dictatorships,
that the modern era requires that legislation be entrusted largely to the
executive power because those exercising it do not need to share the
necessary standard-setting with the lawmakers. As if that were all, as if
the legislative debate could not be reduced to restricted dimensions with-
out detriment to its merits! Let it be noted that this was done among us
by Institutional Act No. 1 and repeated in the Charter of 1967. As if
the legislative debate were not vital to the people, who are really con-
cerned with the legal texts so that they may be able to find out beforehand
what it is sought to be imposed on them. As if the law enacted by
executive order, by dint of the surprise of its content, did not constitute
a dangerous denial of a right, the right to express an opinion on the
rules governing the activities of the people in general.
The Executive Decree is admissible, to a cautiously measured extent,
consonant with the need for extremely urgent laws. This is a need that
is extremely rare in the normal life of the State, and one that can be
satisfied by a declaration of martial law when it occurs with unwonted
frequency, characteristic of abnormal times. Of course, none of the State
powers centralizes in its own domain, all the subject matter from which
it takes its name. But the separation or division of powers never meant
such an extravagance as conferring almost exclusively on one of the powers
of the State the function for which it is named, leaving only a negligible
residue to the other two branches.
The regulatory texts must function, in addition, through proper and
privileged application, protecting the adversary and not favoring the co-
party on a privileged basis. Otherwise, legality would exist on paper, but
not in reality.
THE WORK OF PREPARING THE CODES
As the historical bearer of responsibility in the defense and per-
fecting of the country's legal order, this Institute is intimately concerned
with lawmaking. Since one of the yardsticks for measuring any civiliza-
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tion's progress is the substance and gist of its laws, it is incomprehensible
that, when they are especially relevant to society, their elaboration should
exclude the constructive and critical collaboration of that organization
in Brazil which for over a century has been deeply committed to per-
fecting the legal order. And this becomes important when consideration
is given - not, it is true, with any great prudence - to reforming, all
at one time, the great codes. The greater the undertaking, and the more
hastily planned its execution, the greater the need of allowing the lawyer,
rich in so many ranges of individual professional experience, to have a
constructive voice in the undertaking.
Suffice it to cite as an example, the Civil Code, whose sense of
universality Ruy Cime Lima communicates to us in a page unrivaled for
the stylistic beauty and splendid strength of its synthesis: "In the pro-
visions of our Civil Code we are given, as in the Scriptures, the distinction
between day and night, between dark and light; the separation between
solid land and the seas; between the sterility of the earth and its natural
fertility; the multiplication of the waters from the plains and mountains,
whether from rainfall or from springs, widely dispersed through lakes,
rivers and fluvial tributaries; the sequence of seasons of the year and
the cyclical rounds of the crops and fruits; the variety of vegetation
covering the soil: trees, forests, shrubs, and hedges; and the variety of
animals peopling it and the waters, ranging from those of great weight
through the wild and domestic animals to the fishes. In the midst of the
whole creation, in the civil codes, as in the first book of the Bible, man,
in his turn, emerges as the primordial figure among all the creatures,
and the civil rules minutely describe and accompany his existence from
conception through, successively, infancy, puberty, early maturity, full
maturity, old age and death."
How can a law of so universal a content, the law of life par excellence,
be voted on without extensive discussion throughout the country? How
can it be processed in Congress without a breathing spell between the
work of the learned commission in charge of preparing the bill and
rapid action in the parliamentary area? What we are saying, as an
example, is in no way intended to discredit the group drafting the bill,
which is one of the most outstanding in the juridical history of Brazil,
and one noted for its erudition and moral probity. The sole intent is to
contribute to a broader view of all the subject in the process of recodifica-
tion so as to afford the Congress suitable options in the work carried out
by that body.
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THE DIFFICULT TASK OF LAWMAKING
The practice of the lawyer's profession, regardless of the spheres
in which it is projected, presupposes interpretation of the positive law
and its application to a factual situation. The lawyer is, par excellence,
an interpreter of legal regulations, whether in verbal counsel, in the
handling of legal instruments or the formulation and judicial implementa-
tion of the claim or the defense. The practice of law presupposes the
leafing through law books to analyze them painstakingly and thoroughly
examine their meaning. On the attorney's exegetic labors will depend the
well-being of the client who gives evidence or executes contracts, as
well as that which is affirmed or denied by a subjective law. And since
he is the interpreter par excellence of legal texts, he is particularly
qualified to contribute to their preparation or revision. In full contradic-
tion to what some people suppose, technological development does not
diminish his value in the social context. Without detracting from the
role he has always played, quite to the contrary, it offers him a new
dimension for his activities. As the country's development evolves, econom-
ic relations increase and the more varied are their legal forms. As a
result of new requests from the business sector, the more urgent becomes
the lawyer's presence, whether in preliminary discussion and the trans-
action of legal affairs, or in the subsequent clearing up of the inevitable
controversies arising from conflicts of interest.
The substitution -prevalent among us- of the lawyer by the
economist in the drafting of laws did not turn out well. We are the ones
who are to say no and they are the ones at whom the laws are directed.
Any lessee or lessor could find something to his liking in the
tenancy laws, but today, with Law No. 4,494 of November 23, 1964, the
subject passes the understanding of anyone not versed in the field to
make out what is meant by factor K, values C and D, etc.
Just leaf through the Land Law and you will get an idea of the
confusion in trying to understand- or not understand- the concepts
of "rural real property", "family property", "rural module", "dwarf
holding", "large landed estate", "rural enterprise", "sharecropper", "in.
tegral agrarian reform cooperative" and "land settlement." This is yet
another example of what those laws are like that are drawn up by people
unfamiliar with the techniques of lawmaking.
Examine Decree Law No. 43 of November 18, 1966, and it will be
readily apparent that those were no law school graduates who empowered
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
the National Cinema Institute to grant a certificate oj Brazilian citizenship
to films produced in Brazil!
Let what we are saying not be construed as a slur on the merits
of the professional economists, brilliant, courageous and indispensable
collaborators in the social evolution of our times. What is sought is
merely a reaffirmation of the theory, both dear and personal to them, of
work specialization. Lawmaking, like it or not, is the work for experienced
law school graduates, whether they be lawyers, jurists or politicians,
just as the art of healing is the job of physicians, military strategy
that of soldiers, and economic planning that of economists.
His Excellency the Minister of Justice, an attorney and jurist emeritus,
cannot have failed to see how much there must be revised in the dis-
orderly legislation of recent years in order to consolidate it and to
purge it of technical defects. If political options do not always rest
upon us, there is nothing to prevent us from fighting to see that the laws
which embody them are drafted in accordance with sound legislative
techniques, and that, far from being a confused, sometimes contradictory
clutter of texts, they are a clear and simple expression of the legislators'
intentions. The Institute cannot, I hope, abstain from fighting for this
ideal.
